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ABSTRACT

Data were collected from teacher and trustee representatives on negotiation teams in 13 school districts in Manitoba (Canada) to determine the effects of collective bargaining on the relationship between teachers and boards. Differences were found to center on the issue of authority in such areas as teaching conditions, staffing procedures, and staff development. In addition, to the boards' dismay, collective bargaining has resulted in making 80 percent of the budget (teachers' salaries, fringe benefits) fixed; bargaining often results in a deadlock leading to strikes, lock-outs, and mediation; provincial organizations and other interest groups impose "backstage" control over negotiations; and there is evidence that negotiations are increasingly handled by labor relations experts. In order to reduce the tension, frustration, and suspicion generated by local negotiations, the authors recommend bilevel negotiations at the local and provincial levels. Salaries and fringe benefits could be settled at the provincial level, working conditions and professional development at the school district level. (Author/WD)

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EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

ON

TEACHER - BOARD RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Teacher-Board Relationships had been examined in the context of five problem areas identified in literature. Data were collected from teacher and trustee representatives on the negotiation teams in thirteen school divisions/districts in Manitoba, Canada. Findings indicated that conflicting views were detected regarding the appropriateness of including working conditions in negotiation. Constraints of agreement were also felt by trustees in their policy formulation and financial planning. While negotiations promote mutual understanding, it did little to harmonize relationships. Indeed the frustration in the process of negotiation discouraged both sides to perceive demands and responses in a more positive light and induced them to generalize such feelings to the whole division. Alternative formats to the present process were explored.

EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON TEACHER - BOARD RELATIONSHIP

Originating in the private sector of management - union relations, collective bargaining has been increasingly adopted by teachers and school boards to regulate their respective problems and interests. Its full effects on teachers, trustees, administrators and their interrelationships are yet little known. However, as reflected in the literature, there is increasing concern as to whether such a borrowed method is functioning well. Five possible problem areas have been discovered among the discourse and exploratory studies.

First, differences seem to exist between the positions taken by teachers and school boards as to who should have what kind of authority and control over such matters as: teaching conditions, staffing procedures, staff development, instructional programs, educational finance, and professionalism (Hennessy, 1975, 1977). As teachers demand more participation in deciding educational policies, an area hitherto monopolized by trustees, alarms have been raised, (Glime, 1971; Young, 1971; Fay, 1976; Mankin, 1977), that such sharing of responsibilities tended to confuse areas of jurisdiction and upset the traditional power structure.

Second, related to the perceived infringement on trustees' rights, is the concern that, through collective bargaining, over 80% of the division's budgeting distribution - i.e. teachers' salary, fringe benefits, etc. become fixed, leaving trustees and administrators a negligible proportion on which to make decisions. This drastic departure from the traditional practice when the board exerted considerable control over

how money should be spent catches many trustees unprepared, causing much frustration and dissatisfaction (Newby, 1977).

Third, even though all provinces in Canada have special legislation to govern collective bargaining procedures (Muir, 1976), teacher-board negotiations often end in a deadlock, leading to strikes, lock-outs and the use of mediation. A number of possible causes is identified in literature: Overcommitment to one's own demands and public statements, for example, often preclude any give-and-take process to take place (Lawless, 1976); a lack of basic mutual trust often gives rise to suspicion that the opposite party is more concerned with selfish gains rather than with general educational interests (Goble, 1973); and fast and heated confrontations often harden the unilateral stands on both sides rather than facilitating agreement through modifications (Smith, 1974). As a result, emotion-ridden writings bearing the wound of the present system of negotiations abound (Clement, 1970; DiRicco, 1977; Lieberman, 1978).

A fourth problem area stems from the union-like link that is necessarily maintained between teachers and trustee bargaining units at the local level and their respective provincial organizations. To achieve parity, negotiation at the local level is often compounded with provincial "advice" or "assistance". In this respect, McLeod (1978) has described provincial organizations and other interest groups as backstage participants who impose a remote control over front stage actions in teacher-board negotiations.

Lastly, as in the United States, there is evidence that teacher-board negotiations are more and more handled by an influential infrastructure of labour-relations experts who may become the real decision makers

in the educational realm (Cheng, 1976). Thus, as teacher-board negotiations become institutionalized and professionalized, there is danger that all the principal parties, teachers, administrators, trustees and their constituencies may be pushed into a bystander's position. Such a situation would eliminate pluralistic control of education.

In sum, as collective bargaining becomes the singular means of resolving problems between teacher groups and their boards, it is paramount that we understand all its ramifications. The present study purports to examine existing teacher-board relationships in the context of the five identified problem areas discussed in literature. Two questions were posed to focus the investigation:

(1) Were there significant differences between teacher representatives and board representatives in their perception of teacher-board relationships relative to the five major areas examined?

(2) What factors did teacher negotiators and board negotiators identify as significant influential forces impinging on teacher-board relationships?

METHOD

Variables Selected

The criterion variable,

(a) Teacher-board relationships were assessed in terms of four aspects of negotiations:

(i) The extent to which each bargaining party understands the problems facing the other party (Mutual Understanding);

(ii) The degree of harmony felt in the teacher-board negotiation processes (Harmony);

(iii) The perceived reasonableness of each bargaining party's

position (Felt Reasonableness);

(iv) The extent to which each bargaining party perceives the demands of its opponents as having a collective base rooted in the constituency it represents (Collective Base).

Each of these four aspects of negotiation was attached with a five-point scale ranging from "A", meaning very little to "E", meaning very much on a continuum.

(b) The problem of perceived "infringement of jurisdiction" was assessed by the degree of commonality of concerns between negotiating parties, by the felt appropriateness for inclusion of working conditions in negotiation, and by the order of importance attached to various types of items on the negotiation agenda.

(c) Constraints on budgetary decisions was assessed in terms of the felt restrictions a negotiated settlement imposes on the board and its administrators regarding policy formulation, budget planning, and deployment of staff.

(d) Experience in the process of collective bargaining was measured by the degree of frustration individuals engaged in the negotiations felt and by the amount of time required to reach agreement. The total time consumption was further broken down into the number of hours spent in data preparation, strategy development, consultation with provincial organizations, and the actual bargaining session, including the waiting for feedback from each other.

(e) External influence in the outcomes of negotiation was indic-

ated by the frequency of consultation made with outside groups, and the use of mediators in reaching agreement.

(f) Constituent representativeness of the negotiation assessed the extent to which representatives on each side communicated and sought input from its constituencies during the initial, middle, and final stages of negotiation.

Sample

Twenty school divisions in Manitoba were randomly selected an approached for participation. Thirteen consented to take part. Questionnaires were then sent to all trustees and teachers in these divisions who represented their respective groups in negotiations the year prior to this study. In total, 23 trustees and 43 teachers returned sufficient data for the analysis.

Instrument Validation

Items of the questionnaire were constructed on the basis of the conceptual sources described earlier in this paper. Instrument validity was assessed by Factor Analyses specifically aimed at ascertaining both constructive validity and factorial validity.[1] Subsequently, two separate factor analyses were conducted, one pertaining to the conceptual purity of the dependent variable, and the other the factorial validity of variables in the questionnaire that had potential effects on the dependent variable.

One factor emerged from the four measures of the dependent variable (perceived board-teacher relationship), supporting the assumption that conceptually they assessed the same underlying structure. The obtained commonalities of each measure further reflected the high common factor

variance contributed by each in ascertaining the underlying structure (Table I). In assessing the relative importance of function of these four measures to the dependent variable, "mutual understanding", as is indicated by its corresponding eigenvalue, turned out to be most prominent, followed by "harmony", "felt reasonableness" and "collective base".

Analysis of the remaining items in the questionnaire revealed five identifiable factors (Table II). Factor I was composed of items assessing budgetary restraints on policy formulations, financial planning and personnel administration. Factor II encompassed inputs from constituencies in three crucial stages of collective bargaining. Factor III was made up of items measuring the degree of external interferences from provincial organizations and mediators. Factor IV consisted of variables assessing judicial overlap and appropriateness of including working conditions in negotiation. Factor V subsumed items assessing the experiences of the negotiation process; for example, the degree of frustration felt and time spent in the negotiation process.

It is interesting to note that a number of variables had identical heavy factor loadings on more than one factor. For instance, "Time in the Negotiation Process" displayed heavy loadings on Factors I and V suggesting that the time spent in negotiation was expected or presumed to effect the policy control of the board. Relatively heavy loading of overlapping concerns on Factor V implied that this item compounded the unpleasant feelings arising from negotiation. "Time spent in Negotiation", an item developed from "Negotiation Process", had a heavy loading on Factor III, indicating that much of the time was used in consultation with provincial organizations. Within the context of factorial validity of

the variables employed, high interrelations of these variables cast some doubt on their conceptual purity.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

(1) Perceptual Differences Between Board and Teacher Representatives in Various School Divisions to the Five Possible Problem Areas

According to the data shown in Table III, there were significant differences in perceived human relationships between trustees and teachers in three aspects: "Mutual Understanding", "Harmony", and "Reasonableness." These differences are more evidently displayed between school divisions rather than between trustee representatives and teacher representatives. A more detailed examination of the response patterns showed that even though 77% of trustee representatives and 60% of teacher representatives did not feel that negotiation promoted mutual understanding, a greater proportion of teachers than trustees indicated that it did arouse an awareness of the problems confronting the other party. Similarly, more teachers (32%) than trustees (8%) felt that the process brought harmony to the two concerned parties, and a greater percentage of teachers (50%) than trustees (21%) considered the other party reasonable.

Conflicting perception existed between trustees and teachers, in general, and in separate school divisions, regarding the appropriateness of including working conditions in the negotiation agenda. Raw response patterns indicated most trustees (74%) as objecting, and most teachers (68%) as supportive.

With respect to operational flexibility resulting from collective bargaining, representatives of trustees and teachers differ in their

perception of the sharing of responsibilities in policy control. The same perceptual differences permeate the negotiations held in the various school divisions. More trustees (30%) than teachers (17%) felt that collective bargaining restricted school boards and their administrators in policy formulation and implementation. Such differences were more pronounced (61% trustees vs. 23% teachers) in stating that salary negotiation hindered the board's financial planning.

With regard to how they feel about the present format of negotiation, 74% trustees vs. 42% of teachers found the negotiation process very time-consuming. It is probable that more trustees showed impatience on lengthy negotiations processes because trusteeship is a part-time job. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that both trustees and teachers reported more or less the same total amount of time, in many cases as many as 230 man-hours, spent in the various procedures of preparation, meeting, consultation, negotiation, and communication with constituencies. Addressing themselves to the question of how pleased or frustrated they were, going through the negotiation processes, respondents vary markedly in opinion from one school division to the other. Overall, some 90% of trustees and 85% of teacher representatives assigned their frustration level "moderately" and "greatly" ratings. This negative feeling was clearly registered in both solicited and volunteered comments. Some suggested alternatives to the present format. Others made derogatory remarks about their opponent negotiators.

Concerning the question of "External Interference" in reaching final agreement, significant differences were detected at the div-

isional level, both in terms of how much each relied on advice from provincial organizations, and in the service rendered by arbitrators or conciliators. Apparently, some divisions had a bad experience in collective bargaining and had to resort to total mediation.

No significant differences were found among school divisions' trustees and teachers in "Constituency Representation" during the various stages of negotiation. In general, most trustee and teacher representatives seemed to operate on the "Independent Model of Representation"[2], with little input from the group they represented in various phases of bargaining.

On the whole, the findings of this study confirmed many of the concerns raised in the literature. Collective bargaining generates a considerable amount of tension and disharmony between trustees and teachers as each group probes into responsibility jurisdictions which each group traditionally held isolated from the other. Inflexible procedures, time requirement, external interferences, the attention to details and emotional-laden strategic positions all contributed to generate negative feelings among trustees and teachers engaged in negotiations.

Once chosen to represent their respective groups for negotiation, individual trustee(s) and teacher(s) appear to function single-mindedly with a will to win. Both the tendency to professionalize trustee/teacher negotiators and the increasing use of professional mediators seemed to render support to Cheng's postulation (Cheng, 1976) that a new infrastructure of labour relations experts may dominate education governance by using collective bargaining to usurp decision making powers from the people intimately involved in educa-

tion, namely, parents, teachers, trustees and administrators. Some serious thinking and research are required before we can allow collective bargaining to become a singular and permanent structure for resolving teacher-board relationships (which directly impinges on the quality of education).

(2) Significant Factors Influencing Teacher-Board Relationships

To answer the question of what factors contribute most significantly to the teacher-board relationship, four stepwise Multiple Linear Regression Analyses were undertaken. In terms of mutual understanding,commonality of concerns was the sole significant factor (Table IV A). This suggested that, through the greater commonality of concerns, trustee and teacher representatives become more aware and understanding of the positions of their negotiation counterparts, and the problems inherent in their jobs.

Harmony was affected negatively by the extent of frustration and the amount of arbitrator or conciliator assistance (Table IV B). Apparently, when the process was not smooth-going, as was reflected by frustration and external intervention, the amount of harmony would be drastically reduced.

The perceived reasonableness of the other party could be attributed to the degree of frustration, the extent of arbitrator/conciliator assistance, input from constituencies both at the initial and mid-stages, and the amount of felt restriction on financial planning and on policy formulation (Table IV C). Evidently, the perceived reasonableness shared much in common with the felt harmony of relationships in the negotiation process as each was influenced by similar factors.

Feedback from the constituency trustees and teacher representatives, particularly during the first and second stages of negotiations, understandably influenced their perception of the reasonableness of the other party's requests or responses. It is also very likely that demands from teacher representatives were often assessed in the context of restraints that might affect the board's ability to initiate financial planning and policy development.

With respect to factors that enhance the perceptions of demands having a collective base, it was found that commonality of concerns, inclusion of working conditions in negotiations, amount of time consumed in the collective bargaining and degree of frustration experienced were significant variables (Table IV D). Apparently, both the nature of the content and the process of negotiation furnish and consolidate the basis on which generalizations are made on trustees and teachers of an entire school division.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In examining the attitudes of teacher-board negotiation representatives towards their current interrelationships in thirteen Manitoba School divisions differences of opinions were detected regarding the appropriateness of including working conditions in the negotiation, the possible constraints of settlement on policy formulation and financial planning, and the perceived demand negotiation placed on their time. Divisions also differed considerably in the extent of mutual understanding, harmony and felt reasonableness of the other party. Other than those already identified as areas where teacher and board representatives differed, systematic variations were also found at the division level in the degree of frustra-

tion experienced and the amount of dependence on external assistance in the final settlement. All in all, these denote that the current state of collective bargaining leaves much to be desired.

In the light of the present and other relevant research findings, the wisdom of perpetuating the local or regional level of negotiation as has been done in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Alberta and Ontario is in question. While provincial level negotiation adopted by Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland is not immune from problems, much seems to be able to be accomplished by taking a middle-of-the-road approach (i.e. adopting a bi-level negotiation). Bi-level negotiation at the local and provincial level, it is felt, not only produces a complementary effect to accommodate the overall and individual needs and wishes of the wide range of school divisions in a province, its procedural requirements also help diffuse the many conflicts and difficulties of collective bargaining practices identified by the present investigation. Bi-level negotiation necessitates a clear delineation of issues to be discussed at local and provincial levels. Such a process encourages negotiators to focus their attention on the facts of problems under negotiation rather than on the emotion of bargaining or competition so characteristic of union-management confrontations.

One might suggest that such issues as salary and fringe benefits be settled at the provincial level, so that variations in local cost of living, differentiated salary scales and parity problems would be handled in perspective. On the other hand, specific working conditions and operational roles in curriculum planning, professional development and school regulations etc. are more appropriately tackled within school divisions with the maximum use of resources and insights of local educational prac-

titioners. A formula proposed recently by Lam (in press) offers further guidelines for automatically handling certain teacher-board relational issues in the provincial sector of bi-level negotiation. It suggests that provincial authorities provide an annual automatic adjustment on teacher salary and benefits by accounting for three major components of consideration, including cost of living, economic conditions of the country and teacher qualifications. An automatic and equitable salary adjustment at the provincial level made each year could save hundreds of hours of painstaking negotiations for many people and channel their energy and expertise to more productive activities in education. Within school divisions, trustees, administrators and teachers can also concentrate their attention on resolving common problems relative to the maintenance of high quality education. Given the difficulties generated by high inflation, decreasing enrolment and added responsibilities, educators at all levels need to have undivided attention on meeting with the challenges ahead. Alternative approaches to resolving teacher-board negotiation problems must be sought before the present system of collective bargaining further consumes the energy of educators.

NOTES:

1. For detailed description, refer to Anastasi, A., Psychological Testing, 3rd Ed., New York: MacMillan, 1968, pp. 116-117.

2. For a detailed explanation of the delegate-independent style of representation which trustees displayed, refer to Teichman's "The Role of the Urban School Board Member" Interchange 5:2, 1974, pp. 63-72.

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TABLE I

PRINCIPAL FACTORING WITH ITERATION:
PERCEIVED BOARD-TEACHER RELATIONSHIPS

FACTOR / VARIABLES	COMMUNALITY	EIGENVALUE	% OF VAR.
Mutual Understanding	.43	2.59	51
Harmony	.60	.99	19
Reasonableness	.63	.77	15
Collective Base	.59	.38	7

TABLE II

VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF VARIABLES
HAVING POTENTIAL EFFECTS UPON PERCEIVED
BOARD-TEACHER RELATIONSHIPS

FACTOR LOADING / VARIABLES	FACTORS I	II	III	IV	V
Infringement of Jurisdiction:					
(i) Overlapping Concerns	-.11	.28	.01	.47	-.40
(ii) Working Conditions	-.07	-.12	.09	.64	.07
Budgetary Control					
(i) Policy Formulation	.90	-.02	-.19	-.00	-.12
(ii) Finance	.65	-.04	-.28	.14	.16
(iii) Personnel	.49	.14	.05	.00	.08
Negotiation Process:					
(i) Frustration	-.07	.13	.19	.09	.76
(ii) Perceived Time Consumption	.43	-.11	.02	.04	.43
(iii) Actual Time Involved	.01	-.16	.53	-.04	.09
External Influence					
(i) Provincial Organizations	-.21	.11	.74	.06	.12
(ii) Arbitrators	.32	-.04	.51	.40	.16
Constituency Representation:					
(i) Initial Stage	.13	.41	.07	.37	.00
(ii) Mid-stage	.02	.94	-.08	-.02	-.08
(iii) Last Stage	.15	.69	-.32	.36	.05
Eigenvalue	2.25	1.69	1.27	.92	.60
% of Variance	33.4	25.1	18.9	13.7	8.9

TABLE III

AREAS OF PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES (SUMMARY OF TWO-WAY ANOVA)

VARIABLES/COMPUTATIONS	MAIN EFFECT (1)	SCHOOL DIV. (2)	BD/TEACHER REP. (3)	INTERACTION EFFECTS OF (2) & (3)	EXPLAINED (4)	RESIDUAL (5)	TOTAL
Mutual Understanding							
Sum of Square	30.73	30.37	0.28	14.22	44.95	29.00	73.94
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.34 (P < .002)	3.58 (P < .001)	0.39	2.51 (P < .025)	3.03 (P < .001)	-	-
Harmony							
Sum of Square	37.13	32.07	0.40	12.87	50.01	34.60	84.60
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.39 (P < .001)	3.17 (P < .003)	0.47	1.91	2.82 (P < .002)	-	-
Reasonableness of the Other Party							
Sum of Square	20.56	18.84	0.04	6.26	26.82	28.26	55.08
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	2.30 (P < .022)	2.28 (P < .025)	0.06	1.14	1.85 (P < .045)	-	-
Collective Bass							
Sum of Square	9.96	9.47	0.65	4.94	14.90	24.85	39.75
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.26	1.30	1.07	1.02	1.17	-	-
Overlapping Concerns (Gen.)							
Sum of Square	20.32	20.26	0.13	3.87	24.19	44.80	68.98
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.43	1.55	0.12	0.44	1.05	-	-
Overlapping Concerns (Working Conditions)							
Sum of Square	51.75	35.32	19.28	6.25	58.00	45.27	103.27
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.61 (P < .001)	2.67 (P < .010	17.46 (P < .000)	0.71	2.50 (P < .006)	-	-
Policy Control: Policy Formation							
Sum of Square	42.54	37.62	3.92	6.22	48.77	30.66	79.43
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	4.38 (P < .000)	4.19 (P < .000)	5.25 (P < .027)	1.04	3.11 (P < .001)	-	-
Policy Control: Financial Planning							
Sum of Square	64.85	46.11	13.09	4.89	69.73	44.01	113.75
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	4.65 (P < .000)	3.58 (P < .001)	12.20 (P < .001)	0.57	3.09 (P < .001)	-	-
Policy Control: Deployment of Staff							
Sum of Square	18.43	15.08	1.31	17.78	36.21	41.79	78.00
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.39	1.23	1.29	2.18 (P < .049)	1.69 (P < .074)	-	-
Negotiation Process: Time Consumption							
Sum of Square	38.89	31.73	4.43	4.42	43.30	34.25	77.56
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.58 (P < .001)	3.17 (P < .003)	5.30 (P < .026)	0.66	2.47 (P < .007)	-	-
Negotiation Process: Degree of Frustration							
Sum of Square	26.31	26.05	0.27	3.68	29.99	25.73	55.71
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.23 (P < .003)	3.46 (P < .001)	0.43	0.73	2.28 (P < .012)	-	-
External Interference (Provincial Organizations)							
Sum of Square	95.78	94.28	0.94	4.38	100.16	45.58	143.75
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	6.93 (P < .000)	7.39 (P < .000)	0.88	0.52	4.49	-	-
External Interference (Arbitrator/Conciliator Assistance)							
Sum of Square	77.73	76.12	5.53	20.04	97.77	61.66	159.43
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	3.98 (P < .000)	4.22 (P < .000)	3.68	1.67	3.10 (P < .001)	-	-
Constituency Representation: Initial Stage							
Sum of Square	16.05	13.79	2.60	4.66	20.71	49.61	70.32
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.02	0.95	2.15	0.48	0.82	-	-
Constituency Representation: Middle Stage							
Sum of Square	20.33	19.90	0.05	15.95	36.28	43.00	79.27
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.49	1.58	0.05	1.90 (P < .0.86)	1.65 (P < .085)	-	-
Constituency Representation: Last Stage							
Sum of Square	31.73	30.16	1.87	23.39	55.12	65.30	120.41
D. F.	13	12	1	8	21	41	62
F ratio	1.53	1.58	1.18	1.84 (P < .098)	1.65 (P < .084)	-	-

TABLE IV(A)

STEPWISE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R^2	BETA	df_1/df_2	F
Commonality of Concerns	0.41	0.18	0.32	1/62	5.08*
Prof. Organization Assist.	0.46	0.22	-0.14	2/61	1.83
Time Consumption in Negotiations	0.50	0.25	-0.14	3/60	0.89
Input from Constituency: Initial Stage	0.53	0.28	0.12	4/59	0.72
Arbitrator/Conciliator's Assistance	0.54	0.29	-0.83	5/58	0.71
Input from Constituency: Final Stage	0.55	0.30	0.71	6/57	0.37
Working Conditions	0.56	0.31	0.65	7/56	0.29
Policy Formulation	0.56	0.31	-.011	8/55	0.34
Financial Planning	0.56	0.32	0.65	9/54	0.25
Degree of Frustration	0.56	0.32	-.061	10/53	0.13
Input from Constituency: Mid-Stage	0.57	0.32	0.56	11/52	0.15
Deployment of Staff	0.58	0.32	-.038	12/51	0.08

* sig. at .05 or better.

TABLE IV(B)

STEPWISE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO HARMONY

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R^2	BETA	df_1/df_2	F
Degree of Frustration	0.44	0.19	-0.29	1/62	4.47*
Arbitrator/Conciliator's Assistance	0.51	0.26	-0.24	2/61	3.65*
Input from Constituency Mid-Stage	0.61	0.37	0.15	3/60	1.16
Commonality of Concerns	0.62	0.38	0.09	4/59	0.45
Input from Constituency Final Stage	0.62	0.38	0.11	5/58	0.60
Financial Planning	0.62	0.39	-0.11	6/57	0.58
Professional Organization Assistance	0.63	0.39	-0.07	7/56	0.28
Input from Constituency Initial Stage	0.63	0.40	-0.10	8/55	0.56
Deployment of Staff	0.63	0.40	0.06	9/54	0.22
Working Conditions	0.64	0.40	0.67	10/53	0.26
Time Consumption in Negotiations	0.64	0.41	-0.03	11/52	0.06
Policy Formulation	0.64	0.41	0.02	12/51	0.01

* sig. at .05 or better.

TABLE IV(C)

STEPWISE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PERCEIVED REASONABLENESS OF THE OTHER PARTY

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R^2	BETA	df_1/df_2	F
Degree of Frustration	0.41	0.17	-0.34	1/62	6.55*
Arbitrator/Conciliator's Assistance	0.50	0.25	-0.20	2/61	6.75*
Input from Constituency Mid-Stage	0.50	0.32	0.25	3/60	5.11*
Financial Planning	0.60	0.36	-0.23	4/59	5.17*
Policy Formulation	0.62	0.39	0.23	5/58	2.62*
Input from Constituency Initial Stage	0.64	0.41	-0.19	6/57	2.94*
Input from Constituency Final Stage	0.66	0.43	0.99	7/56	1.23
Professional Organization Assistance	0.67	0.44	0.71	8/55	0.83
Working Conditions	0.69	0.45	0.70	9/54	0.57
Commonality of Concerns	0.67	0.45	-0.76	10/53	0.47
Deployment of Staff	0.67	0.45	0.38	11/52	0.13
Time Consumption in Negotiations	0.68	0.46	0.40	12/51	0.13

* sig. at .05 or better.

TABLE IV(D)

STEPWISE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PROJECTED PERCEPTION

VARIABLE	MULTIPLE R	R^2	BETA	df_1/df_2	F
Commonality of Concerns	0.23	0.05	0.22	1/62	4.32*
Working Conditions	0.33	0.11	-0.16	2/61	3.22*
Time Consumption in Negotiations	0.41	0.17	0.24	3/60	4.86*
Degree of Frustration	0.47	0.22	-0.29	4/59	5.37*
Policy Formulation	0.50	0.25	-0.18	5/58	1.76
Financial Planning	0.52	0.27	0.84	6/57	0.77
Deployment of Staff	0.53	0.28	0.10	7/56	1.02
Input from Constituency Final Stage	0.54	0.29	0.92	8/55	1.12
Arbitrator/Conciliator's Assistance	0.55	0.30	-0.53	9/54	0.52
Professional Organization Assistance	0.55	0.30	0.44	10/53	0.35
Input from Constituency Initial Stage	0.55	0.31	-0.46	11/52	0.19
Input from Constituency Mid-Stage	0.55	0.31	-0.22	12/51	0.05

* sig. at .05 or better.